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The Societas Europaea (SE) harmonized a minimum of company law and assigned employee representation to a supplementary negotiation process. Commentators predicted that it would introduce cross-border regulatory competition to the EU. Others suggested that companies would choose the SE over other national corporate forms, in order to moderate the requirements of mandatory employee representation. This paper reports case-study evidence to argue that companies are utilizing the form in a third, more significant way: to facilitate withingroup restructurings that make regulation by a single supervisor possible. Their actions generate pressure for the unification of additional areas of law and the development of new regional regulatory systems. Empowering the SE would therefore lead to increased integration of corporate oversight within Europe.
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I. Introduction
The European Union (EU) recently implemented the Societas Europaea (SE), a transnational, pan-European form for company law. 2 The initial goal for the SE was to offer companies a complete set of European company law rules in order to facilitate their operations across the region.
3 Disparate attitudes towards employee representation on company boards, board structure, and taxation, however, made it impossible for the Member States to agree on a single standard. 4 In order to reach a consensus, the European Member States compromised on a framework structure that harmonized only minimal company law, leaving the rest to national law. 5 They also assigned employee representation to a complicated, supplementary negotiation process. 6 Thirty different possible SE companies resulted, 7 along with some opportunities for changes to employee representation on boards.
A first wave of commentators predicted the introduction of cross-border regulatory competition to the EU. 8 Another line of scholarship has suggested A series of decisions by the European Court of Justice (ECJ), beginning in 1999, however, began to shift the political landscape in which the debate over the SE and regulatory competition was taking place. 14 The ECJ clarified that a company incorporated in one Member State may establish a branch in another Member State and use it to conduct all of the company's business. 15 It expanded the Freedom of Establishment to include rights to a more favorable company law and tax law. 16 The Court also disallowed Member States from refusing to recognize the legal personality of a company that has moved its central administration into the State but remains registered elsewhere. 17 The final SE legislation, in force since October 8, 2004, explicitly enables companies to transfer their registered seats, 18 provided that they also move their headquarters. 19 It marks the first legal means for reincorporating within Europe. 20 As Luca Enriques first noted, 21 the SE's ability to move combines with its references to national law to create new possibilities for Member States to compete for incorporations. 22 Many commentators, consequently, have forecast a new European corporate charter market. 23 Others who have analyzed the SE, however, have concluded that it will not attract a sufficient number of companies. 24 
B. Internal Arbitrage
In addition, rather than preempting national law, 25 the SE legislation exists alongside it. Companies may choose between the rules of the new form and the law of their home countries. 26 If they adopt the SE, they can reorganize their boards according to the SE Directive, raising concerns that the form will contribute to a reduction in European workers' rights.
Codetermination developed from the efforts of European trade unions to secure for their members a direct say in the affairs of the companies for which they worked. Many Member States specify a level of employee representation required on the boards of different types of companies of different sizes, while others have no equivalent system. 27 Consequently, the implementation of EU-level initiatives that affect workers' rights to representation has posed a persistent challenge. 28 To pass the SE, the European Commission struggled to craft provisions on employee representation sufficiently liberal to satisfy the Member States that have not mandated it, without antagonizing the Member States committed to its continuation. 29 The first proposed legislation, drafted in 1970, 30 mimicked the most rigorous national requirements for representation. 31 The Commission's next proposal, in 1989, 32 divided the legislation into a Regulation and a Directive, and relegated provisions for employee representation to the Directive. 33 After it failed to draw sufficient support, the Commission established a High Level Expert Group, chaired by former Commission President Etienne Davignon. The Group devised a solution to the deadlock on employee representation by judging the Member States' attitudes towards representation too diverse for harmonization and outlining a negotiation process, in place of a static set of compromise rules. 34 The final Directive sets out a compulsory negotiation period between management and workers, with a principle known as "before-after" taking effect when negotiations fail. According to the principle, management must guarantee that the same level of representation, if any, will continue after conversion to the SE. 35 The Directive seemed to assure the Member States that companies with representation would not be able to use the SE to evade it, and that companies without representation would not have to offer it to their workers if they converted to the SE.
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Horst Eidenmüller and others have noted that the SE Directive nevertheless creates opportunities for arbitrage within Member States over employee representation. 37 Eidenmüller, Engert, and Hornuf (2009) posed fourteen questions to SE companies in Germany during twenty-minute telephone surveys and found strong evidence that they are utilizing the SE to mitigate national representation requirements.
A more comprehensive empirical analysis of the reasons that companies incorporate as SE's has not, however, been conducted until now. This paper presents empirical data gathered through a year-long series of in-person interviews with corporate decision makers, union leaders, legal advisors, and policymakers in several Member States and at EU headquarters. 38 The paper includes conversations with representatives of companies that have transformed into SE's, as well as those that have not.
The interview data demonstrate that companies in specific industries have used the SE to correct a misalignment that has developed between national regulatory oversight and international business activities. Most companies in Europe have continued to report to multiple national supervisors, even as the strategies they pursue and the risks they assume take place on an increasingly regional or global level. 39 Because the SE allows for legal cross-border mergers and international reincorporations, it facilitates regional restructuring by enabling companies to replace their subsidiaries with branches. Leading multinational companies have converted to the SE and adopted a branched structu-re, in order to submit to an integrated regulation at the level of the parent company.
The legislation has not been as effective as expected, however. A substantial number of the 112 registered SE companies do not currently operate. 40 While the SE's framework design earned critical political support, harmonizing only some laws and not others has allowed for national law and regulation to interfere with the potential benefits of conversion to the form. Individual laws can not easily be isolated from the broader systems within which they operate.
Harmonizing additional areas of company law is therefore essential to improving the viability of regional initiatives such as the SE, if that is the primary goal. Empowering the SE would be likely to stimulate the integration of corporate oversight in Europe.
II. Methodology
This article is based on data I gathered in seventy-five interviews, with general counsels, chief financial officers, and other legal advisors at one half of the active SE's. 41 The companies included have headquarters in Austria, Belgium, China, Cyprus, Estonia, France, Finland, Germany, Luxembourg, Norway, the United Kingdom, and Sweden and comprise the biotechnology, chemicals, electronics, financial services, insurance, medical equipment, metals, oil, paper, real estate, and reinsurance industries.
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For context, I also interviewed legal academics, representatives to the European Commission, company lawyers, labor advocates, journalists, and policy analysts at European think tanks and non-governmental organizations. Directors and officers of companies that considered SE conversions but decided against them, in Bermuda, the Czech Republic, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, the Netherlands, Norway, the United Kingdom, Sweden, and Switzerland, offered additional viewpoints.
Case study evidence of European companies' perceptions of the SE sheds light 40 on their decision-making processes and the mechanisms though which EU legislation can promote integration of the European market, or introduce cross-border or within-country arbitrage. 43 Alternative methodologies to conducting fieldwork in multiple jurisdictions introduce significant limitations in this context. The wide variation in numbers of SE companies across Member States, in the total numbers of companies in each Member State eligible to transform, and also in the numbers of companies that operate transnationally and for which conversion would therefore be attractive makes country-level comparison difficult. The non-operational SE's also complicate meaningful quantitative analysis. The SE legislation's recent implementation further precludes gathering time-series evidence in order to demonstrate causation. Additionally, because all of the European Member States have transcribed the legislation, there is no variable to use as a control. The in-depth interviews also reveal disparities between companies' intentions in converting and the legal obstacles they have actually encountered: while companies may state their interest in reincorporating or in recalibrating their boards, they may later decide against it after thoroughly investigating the requirements.
My data suggest that most companies have adopted the SE to streamline their multinational operations and to reduce their regulatory obligations. This generates pressure for the unification of additional areas of law and the development of new regional regulatory systems. I found that if the SE is to remain viable, it will spur further harmonization of company law in the EU, decreasing legal diversity. In addition, specific features of the SE legislation limit companies from using it for arbitrage, and it has introduced only minimal competition between Member States. Member States that do seek to retain or attract new companies, however, will likely move towards a closer equilibrium in the terms they offer to them, eventually leading to less overall variability in the law. While the SE does not appear to threaten the perpetuation of employee representation on company boards, it has diversified and also decreased the number of workers serving on them, bringing the Member States into closer alignment on the issue and challenging labor unions to adapt their strategies to the regional level. 44 43 This study has not intended perfectly to describe the legal rules operating in the European Member States. Rather, it has sought to utilize the data generated in the interviews to illuminate the legal landscape facing European companies considering conversion to the SE. The SE's facilitation of regional restructuring has attracted a large proportion of companies to convert to the form. The SE's ability to complete cross-border mergers has allowed them to absorb their subsidiaries and establish branches, without the legal contortions that had previously been necessary. 52 Branched structures have enabled the companies to streamline their international operations, save VAT taxes, and gain integrated supervision, within specific industries. In the financial, insurance, and reinsurance sectors, for example, regulation by a single supervisor has reduced administrative and compliance costs and allowed for the pooling of regulatory capital. 53 Companies in industries in which a parent company and its branches are not regulated together, however, have been less likely to adopt the SE. The complete legal environment with which companies interact constrains what they can use the form to accomplish. Pressure for increased legal harmonization and regionalized regulation will build as companies interested in converting to the SE encounter its limitations. The SE formed a necessary part of the restructuring. Although transforming into an SE cost Allianz ninety-five million Euros and took more than one year, without the capacity for cross-border mergers, Allianz could only have acquired RAS through a takeover bid. 57 While a merger requires the approval of twothirds of a target's shareholders, 58 a takeover bid requires the cash acquisition of nearly all of the target's shares, in order to trigger a squeeze-out process. National law prescribes the squeeze-out threshold; in Italy the threshold is ninetyeight percent. 59 Observers say that hold-out shareholders would have prevented Allianz from buying enough shares in RAS to complete a takeover. Other companies have used the SE to merge with their international subsidiaries and replace them with branches. While subsidiaries must report individually to their national regulators, branches in some sectors 61 may report jointly to the national regulators of their parent companies. 62 The streamlined supervision that results reduces compliance costs and eliminates conflicting obligations. 63 Scor, the French reinsurance company, became an SE to take advantage of the 2005 Reinsurance Directives, which offer combined supervision to reinsurance companies and their branches. 64 It first transformed Scor SA, the French holding company at its head, into Scor SE. During the next year and a half, it established two subordinate SE companies, Scor Global Life SE and Scor Global P&C SE; merged into them its German, Italian, and Dutch subsidiaries; and set up new branches in their place. 65 In addition to decreasing its reporting burden, the new structure has generated savings in compliance and corporate governance costs for the company: branches, unlike subsidiaries, do not have to make corporate filings, convene separate boards, 66, 67 or pay VAT taxes on transactions with their parent companies. Companies that use the SE to replace their subsidiaries with branches decrease the amount of money that they must hold in reserve. Under the solvency rules, subsidiaries must set aside their own funds, whereas money held by branches counts for the parent company. Scor and Sampo Life, the Finnish life insurance company, achieved reductions in regulatory capital through the adoption of branched SE structures.
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Sampo Life merged its Estonian, Lithuanian, and Latvian subsidiaries into Sampo Life Insurance Baltic, an SE company headquartered in Estonia, and established new branches in Lithuania and Latvia. 73 The money the subsidiaries independently held now counts for the company's total reserves because it is located in the SE's branches. 74 Using the SE to absorb the subsidiaries, rather than the Directive on CrossBorder Mergers, mitigated scrutiny of Sampo Life from national supervisors.
75
The SE conversion signaled a legitimate, European-level restructuring. 76 As the CFO of a multinational reinsurance company stated, "It's much brighter to say we're becoming an SE -we consider Europe a unique market and we will act through branches -than it is to say we're pulling out our subsidiaries." Other interview subjects in the study similarly characterized the SE as an 69 Reinsurance Directives recital (9) Swiss Re, the insurance and reinsurance multinational, adopted the SE in order to gain access to EU legislation more cheaply. Using the form, it shifted its insurance and reinsurance businesses from their original Swiss headquarters to two new Luxembourgian entities. 80 Other companies, however, have undertaken similar restructurings without the SE.
The rules governing SE's enabled Swiss Re to consolidate its insurance subsidiaries in Luxembourg without disturbing their licenses to conduct business in the U.S. 81 The company combined its British and Dutch subsidiaries into a British SE, moved the SE to Luxembourg, and established a German branch. British law does not provide for legal mergers, so the company used a courtapproved transfer of assets and liabilities to join the subsidiaries. Completing the move without using the SE form, however, would have required it to liquidate each business, establish new companies in Luxembourg, and apply and pay for new licenses.
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Partner Re, another multinational reinsurance company, transferred its headquarters from Switzerland to Ireland to qualify for the EU Reinsurance Directives but did not convert to the SE. The company feared exposure to employee representation on its board and unpredictability in its tax treatment, particularly its rights to offset losses in one jurisdiction against its total profits. It also believed that remedying gaps or problems in the legislation would require it to petition national courts one at a time, rather than directly lobbying a single body. 83 To relocate its reinsurance subsidiaries, Swiss Re used the 2005 Directive on Cross-Border Mergers, not the SE. It formed a private company in Luxembourg and has gradually merged in the subsidiaries. 
SE Limitations
In order to pass the SE legislation, the Member States devised a framework structure that referenced their individual laws. Without additional harmonization, 85 however, it is unlikely that the form will attract many companies. Companies in regulated industries without regional supervisory systems have few incentives to convert to the SE.
a. Deposit Guarantees
Uncoordinated national deposit guarantee systems impede European banks from transforming into SE's. Banks contribute to funds guaranteeing their savings in every country in which they operate. 86 Each country has different rules on coverage limits, the priority given to deposits, ex ante or ex post financing, and other features. 87 In 2003, Nordea Bank publicized its plans to become an SE company. It wanted to integrate its subsidiaries into a Swedish SE and operate through branches. The branched structure would confer centralized supervision, savings on compliance and governance expenses, and a larger lending base. Estonia, with no tax on retained earnings; Ireland, with a twelve-and-a-half percent tax rate; and Slovakia, with a seventeen percent tax rate, feared the elimination of their competitive advantages. 104 Operating across multiple taxation systems, however, has subjected companies to double taxation and under taxation, encouraged overly tax-driven arrangements, and increased compliance costs. 105 Each country has taxed a company's subsidiaries and branches individually, and companies have had no ability to consolidate their overall profits and losses.
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Discussions of a unified taxation scheme have proliferated, 107 and most companies in this study favor a proposal called the Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB). 108 The CCCTB sets out a common definition of taxable profit and procedures for allocating the profit among the Member States but does not affect national tax rates. 109 Under the CCCTB, a company would consolidate its total income according to a uniform set of rules for deductions and other accounting issues, assign the income proportionally among the locations in which it operated, and pay taxes according to national rates.
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B. Regulatory Arbitrage?
While the SE offers a legal process to European companies to reincorporate 111 and leaves to national law such core subjects as directors' liability, insolvency, auditing, and criminal rules, few have actually used the SE to move and take advantage of national differences in these areas. Based on the empirical data, it appears that the complete legislation and the context in which it operates limit the benefits that companies achieve by relocating. 112 The companies that have reincorporated have done so for unique reasons, and others that are similar and have transformed into SE's have not moved. All of the companies in the study has ) ("due to the above-mentioned path dependencies much time will be needed before a dynamic competition process can develop, and it can be expected that this competition will have to tackle with a whole set of serious problems.").
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A Third Wayreported a preference for a corporate form offering a uniform set of European rules, as the original plans for the SE intended.
SE Requirements
The core of the SE legislation developed prior to the Centros line of cases, when political opinion disfavored U.S.-style charter competition. Article Seven of the SE Regulation requires companies to establish their headquarters in the same Member State where they register, in line with the real seat theory. The rule has made the SE inflexible and discouraged companies from moving. Many companies in the study explained that they were unlikely to reincorporate because they would also have to move their headquarters.
113
Transferring headquarters to a different country is difficult for companies to do. Enough of their employees must be willing to move. Smaller companies tend to be embedded in their local economies, 114 and larger companies tend to have political ties to their countries. 115 Moving can also draw negative publicity. 116 A Finnish corporation that explored relocating in order to avoid Finnish bid rules 117 decided not to because "headquarters are political". See Narada, the battery manufacturing company previously based in Norway, moved an SE company from Norway to the UK, in the absence of such concerns. It structured a new joint venture with the Norwegian telecommunications company Eltek as an SE, to allow for flexibility to hire staff in any country in Europe. After selecting a British manager, it transferred the SE to the UK. 119 
SE Expenses
Exit taxes, dissenters' rights, and labor negotiations raise the cost of using the SE to move. Many companies initially interested in reincorporating have found the process too expensive after a full investigation of the requirements. Those that have moved, however, have contributed to convergence in the laws of the Member States.
Although the SE made it legal for companies to reincorporate, 120 the legislation did not eliminate national exit taxes 121 that they must pay to leave. The SE legislation also allows Member States to require departing companies to compensate their creditors and shareholders who vote against the move.
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The cost of complying is unpredictable, making it difficult for companies to evaluate the merits of a potential reincorporation.
Elcoteq, the electronics manufacturing company originally located in Finland and a main supplier to Nokia, the Finnish electronics company, became the first company to convert to the SE for the purpose of reincorporating. Elcoteq had difficulties recruiting talented employees to Finland, 127 and most of its officers worked from Switzerland. Only one percent of its workforce lived in Finland.
Elcoteq chose Luxembourg because of its bilateral tax treaty with Switzerland. 128 It merged its Finnish parent company with its Luxembourgian subsidiary to create a Luxembourgian SE, and established new branches in Finland and Switzerland. 129 The tax treaty eliminates taxes at the level of the head office on income the company allocates to the Swiss branch and enables interest on loans originating from the Swiss branch to qualify as a cost, reducing the company's overall taxable income. Elcoteq's shareholders approved the move in 2005, but those who voted against it had the right to resell their shares. The company could not predict how many shareholders would and therefore the cost of the reincorporation. The legislation also did not clarify whether the dissenting shareholders should receive the average share price during the period leading up to the shareholder vote or the price on the day of the vote.
131
Moving from Finland to Luxembourg caused convergence in the countries' laws.
132 Finland, like most European countries, does not proscribe a nominal share value, but Luxembourg has. 133 To smooth negotiations, Luxembourg repealed its rules.
134 Luxembourg has also legislated a "one share-one vote" requirement, 135 while Finland has not, 136 and Elcoteq amended its share structure to comply with Luxembourg law. The company had originally issued two series of shares, with the shares held by the founders carrying ten times the votes of the other series.
137
The SE's provisions for employee representation also exposed Eastern European Member States to Finland's robust protections on workers' rights. Elcoteq struggled to negotiate with representatives from its Baltic subsidiaries. Some countries had to draft new laws to establish a process for selecting employee representatives. 138 Others lacked translations for basic collective bargaining vocabulary. 139 Prosafe, the Norwegian shipping company, also found it expensive to use the SE to reincorporate. 140 The company moved to Cyprus in order to avoid changes to avoid double taxation, the global institutions offered a forum at once more favorable than national politics and yet able to be leveraged into such politics through the argument: this is what everyone else is doing; you'd better join the club."). Norway's national tonnage tax system. 141 In 1996, Norway adopted a permissive scheme of tonnage taxation to make itself a competitive shipping base. It did not tax companies' operating profits unless they paid taxable dividends to shareholders or moved their assets out of the country. 142 In September 2006, however, the government announced a new plan to reclaim the tax credits. It demanded payment on all tax liabilities deferred under the 1996 law over a period of ten years and moved to impose forward taxes on shipping companies. 143 When Prosafe left Norway, it paid the full amount of its deferred tax liabilities.
144
Since the reincorporation, Norway has passed new exit taxes that fine companies as if their full valuation has been realized. Odjfell, another Norwegian shipping company, converted to the SE in order to leave Norway but has remained incorporated there. 
SE Limitations
Although the SE has made it legal for companies to reincorporate, in the absence of a U.S.-style internal affairs doctrine, companies derive few benefits from relocating. Consequently, they have shown caution in using the form to move. By contrast, numerous startup companies have registered in the UK to gain other advantages the jurisdiction offers, following the recent case law of the ECJ.
The application of laws and regulations in Europe generally does not depend on where a company has incorporated. Most business and labor regulations apply based on where the company operates. 146 Many aspects of the securities laws pertain to where shares are traded. 147 Companies pay taxes where they earn income, not where they are incorporated. SE companies that do not conduct business or employ any workers, known as shelf companies (shelfs), suggest the possibility for future relocations, however. 149 Private companies, such as Foratis AG in Germany, create the empty corporate structures to sell. 150 Their customers can move the shelfs into any Member State and put them into operation. Conducting business through a company that was once a shelf saves the buyers time and may increase access to investment capital and other contracts.
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Shelf companies account for the majority of registered SE's, 152 although the percentage of SE companies that conduct business is growing. 153 [ Figure 3 ]. While only four shelf companies have become operational, others could be moved and activated at any time. 154 The low-cost German airline Air Berlin, for example, registered as a British plc, went public, and listed on the German DAX. 155 British plcs avoid employee participation rules, although workers must continue to serve on the boards of subsidiaries in countries that mandate participation. 156 The British incorporations have also resulted in convergence among the laws of the Member States. France, 157 Spain, 158 Germany, 159 and the Netherlands have all recently eliminated or lowered their minimum capital requirements to match the UK's more lenient standards. 160 The Dutch and German consultation documents explicitly reference the need to compete with the UK.
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Germany has also begun to allow new companies to establish themselves according to the same terms that the UK offers, 162 and the Dutch Parliament has launched a review of its private limited company law. 163 
C. Internal Arbitrage?
Because the SE legislation did not preempt national laws, companies may convert to the form in order to substitute its rules for national requirements. 164 As SE's, they can select between a one-tier or two-tier board 165 and renegotiate employee representation, 166 raising concerns that they will adopt the form to arbitrage around national standards for workers' rights. 167 In fact, while some companies have adopted one-tier board structures, and others have used the SE to decrease the size of their Supervisory Boards and appoint foreign works to them, the costs have been high and labor unions are adapting. The interview data suggest that the SE will contribute to an eventual equilibrium of smaller, more international Supervisory Boards and more regionalized labor strategies. Even though companies are using the SE to relax employee representation, those accustomed to it appear committed to the stakeholder model, in which companies serve the interests of employees and other groups rather than maximizing shareholder wealth. 168 
SE Limitations
Only small companies without codetermination have used the SE to choose a one-tier board. Every participant in the study emphasized that large corporations with employee representatives would never eliminate the barrier restricting them to a supervisory function. The national laws of most Member States that require dual boards do not delineate how a one-tier board with employees representatives should function, although Germany has explicitly legislated codetermination in one-tier SE companies. 169 Companies too small for codetermination, 170 however, have adopted a one-tier structure to streamline their operations and to increase the power of their executive directors, aligning themselves more closely with companies from Member States without employee representation systems.
Plansee, the closely-held Austrian metalworks company, used the SE to replace its two-tier board with a one-tier board, even though it had to increase the number of outside directors to do so. Plansee is part of a group of related companies. The other two are based in Luxembourg and have one-tier structures. Their managing directors previously served on the Supervisory Board of Plansee and could therefore control Plansee's managing director. With the one-tier SE, all of the managing directors sit on the same level in all three companies. Plansee's lawyers and officers say that the new organization appears more understandable to potential foreign investors and venture partners.
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PCC, the closely-held German energy company, also established a unitary board after converting to the SE. The new format has helped the owner, who chairs the board, to consolidate his authority. Before the conversion, a Supervisory Board of three outside directors ratified his decisions. The integrated board now has only one external member, a former representative to the Supervisory Board, who serves alongside the owner and a former member of the Management Board. The owner can more easily pass initiatives he proposes under the new arrangement.
172
PCC also describes the European branding that the SE carries as an additional benefit of its conversion. 173 The company conducts extensive operations in Poland and has failed at attempted takeovers of two Polish chemical companies. It blames the failures on Polish perceptions of German ownership as a threat to employment and has enthusiastically embraced the European status that the SE confers. 
SE Expenses
Every German company with codetermination has retained its two-tier board structure after converting to the SE, 175 but many have changed the size and composition of their Supervisory Boards. 176 The SE Directive sets out a process for negotiating an agreement with workers that has the potential to ease the demands of codetermination, even though the overall proportion of employee representation cannot change. 177 The process has proven both costly and difficult, however, and the companies that have undertaken it have not eliminated codetermination entirely, as they could have by reincorporating in a Member State that does not require it. 178 Instead, the companies in the study characterized codetermination as an important instrument of legitimacy for making decisions adverse to their workers. 179 While more concentrated governance makes it faster for companies to make choices and implement them, codetermination facilitates consensus and defuses conflict. Member States with employee representation require it to varying degrees, and Germany has the most rigorous system. Germany's rules include two significant thresholds: companies with more than 500 employees but less than 2,000 must offer one third of their Supervisory Board seats to employee representatives; 181 companies with more than 2,000 employees must offer one half of the positions. 182 In the latter case, the size of the Supervisory Board is fixed by mandatory law. 183 German companies with fewer than 2,000 employees have therefore converted to the SE in order to hold the proportion of employee representatives to the lower level. Those with more than 2,000 employees have utilized the SE to renegotiate the size of the Supervisory Board, even though they have not been able to change the percentage of representation on the board. 184 Fresenius, the German healthcare company, transformed into an SE to freeze the size of its Supervisory Board. With a staff of 1,000 in 100 countries, it planned to acquire a hospital business. Expanding to more than 2,000 employees would otherwise have enlarged its Supervisory Board to twenty people from twelve. 185 German codetermination rules mandate Allianz to provide half of its Supervisory Board seats to employees because it has a workforce of more than 181,000, but the SE allowed it some changes. In accordance with the negotiation process set out in the SE Directive, the company created a Special Negotiating Body of European employees to conduct negotiations with management. The negotiations concluded with a reduction in the size of the Supervisory Board from twenty to twelve, albeit with the same fifty percent ratio of employees that German law requires. 186 Whereas all of the employee representatives previously were German, the new Supervisory Board includes a French and a British worker. 187 Companies with and without codetermination emphasized in interviews that smaller Supervisory Boards are easier to coordinate. Fewer people can more quickly make decisions. Smaller numbers improve confidentiality and save money that companies spend on board salaries. 188 The cost of converting to an SE to make changes can be substantial, however, and some German companies have elected to keep their original Supervisory Boards in place rather than enter the negotiations. 189 All of the German SE's that have negotiated their representation have used the entire six-month period that the Directive allows. BASF, the German chemical company, spent three months simply to nominate and elect thirty-two representatives to the Special Negotiating Body from the different countries in which it operates. 190 For some companies, the "before-after" fallback principle has blocked any adjustments, despite what they have paid to initiate the process. 191 Legal uncertainties regarding what companies can negotiate also persist. Allianz, as well as BASF, has asserted that a company's Articles of Association determine the size of its Supervisory Board. 192 Other legal commentators, however, have suggested that the size of the Supervisory Board can itself be established through the negotiation process with the Special Negotiating Body. 193 The language of the legislation does not clearly resolve the question.
Labor unions are observing the developments closely. The reduction in the size of Allianz's Supervisory Board to twelve and the internationalization of its members tracks the experience of other large German companies that have made the transition to the SE. 194 Some fear the form will weaken labor strength because employees from different Member States have conflicting interests and no history of acting together. 195 Others argue that internationalization enhances the legitimacy of employee representation because it reflects the actual composition of modern workforces. 196 According to the European Trade Union Institute for Research, Education, and Health and Safety (ETUI), the SE is forcing the creation of a more regional arrangement for union activities. 197 The European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC) has begun to intermediate in negotiations and provides translators to help workers act collectively. It hopes to broaden the workers' goals, as multinational corporations pay decreasing attention to national-level unions that refer to rights under national law and pit national unions against each other.
198
The SE has also introduced discussions about workers' rights to countries with few protections of them. Unionization varies widely among the Member States. 199 Yet every country in which an SE operates provides representatives to the Special Negotiating Body, spreading awareness of bargaining power to countries that have not allowed it. Sampo Life Insurance Baltic, for example, trained candidates to the Special Negotiating Body from its Estonian, Latvian, and Lithuanian entities, where workers had not undertaken similar roles. 200 When Nordea began the process of converting to the SE, it coordinated with its principal union, the Confederation of the Nordic Bank, Finance and Insurance Unions (NFU), to strengthen union organization at its subsidiaries. More than eighty percent of the Swedish population belongs to a union, and Swedish companies with twenty-five employees or more must appoint workers to their boards, 201 but Poland was the only subsidiary with a trade union. The NFU received a grant from the European Union to conduct a series of meetings at the subsidiaries in which Nordea's directors participated. According to the directors, the company benefitted from developing reliable employee contacts.
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IV. Conclusion
Companies have chosen the SE for the "third way," the within-group restructuring possibilities and regulatory efficiencies that it offers, especially where they have been able to achieve regional supervision. Others that have decided against converting have flagged their desire for more harmonization of company law.
Some companies have transformed into SE's in order to reincorporate or to adjust the organization of their boards, as Enriques and Eidenmueller described. The legislation's drafting, along with interference from national legal systems, however, limits the gains companies can actually achieve through these uses.
The SE embodies the critical challenge of how to integrate economic markets at the regional level, while retaining respect for national autonomy. The creation of a European corporate form tested the ability of the Member States to pool their authority over company law.
Out of political necessity, the EU had to preserve diversity in its Member States' laws. In order to reach a compromise, it developed a simple framework for the SE, with minimal European-level law.
The Commission unveiled the SE in the absence of true European company law or corporate tribunals. But while use of the form has been selective, and it has captured the interest only of selected companies, the SE seems to have become a pilot project for what European company law could represent and pointed to the sectors and Member States most likely to want it.
Rather than triggering countries to compete to offer attractive legal regimes, it is companies that are actively using the SE to consolidate regulatory control. Companies want to take full advantage of integrated markets, to improve their position in the marketplace by reducing costs and gaining regulatory predictability. Their use of the SE, in combination with home-country regulation, has facilitated vertical integration of firms in some industries.
The companies are several steps ahead of the Member States themselves. When the Member States have tried to design regional and cross-border initiatives, to get to any agreement, they have had to compromise, but they have struggled to cooperate. While they have sought the benefits of market integration, they also have not wanted to lose out on their other prudential concerns, such as maintaining regulatory control and retaining or avoiding employee representation on boards.
Companies are not so concerned with cooperation and coordination. Where they have been able to, they have bypassed the Member States' inability to coordinate cross-border regulation by carrying out their own restructuring and moving directly to regulation by a single Member State. In exploiting this unintended potential of the SE, they have effectively outsmarted the lawmakers in the Member States. Their use of the SE has been less about coordination than it has been about the limits of coordination, given global capital flows.
The developments are playing out with specificity in the corporate arena, instead of remaining a pure policy debate. Companies will provide measurable answers regarding the extent to which regulatory consolidation makes it as costless as possible for companies to operate across national boundaries, or whether their savings come at the expense of other stakeholders. If companies can document increased revenues, benefits to workers, or improved transparency from integrated regulation, they provide support for the overall goal of regionalization and the objectives of the European Union itself.
